The plan of the Kremlin and the potential of the Russian army. New RUSI report

Scientists predict the peak of the combat power of the Russian army at the end of 2024, and problems with their material and technical support are expected only in 2025.

Russia's theory of victory in Ukraine has undergone various iterations throughout the war, but the Kremlin now has a clear plan for how it should proceed. This was the conclusion reached by researchers at the Royal Joint Defense Research Institute (RUSI) Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds.

In their report, the experts also note that this plan is supported by the sufficiently high combat power of the Russian army.

Strategic goals

The strategic goal of the Kremlin – the subjugation of Ukraine – remains unchanged, scientists believe. Now Moscow firmly believes that they are winning, so they are making clear demands on Kiev for a truce – to give up the already occupied territories (and in some options together with Kharkiv and Odesa), agree not to join NATO and retain the head of state approved by Russia. The only significant concession offered by Moscow is to allow the "remains" of Ukraine to join the EU.

According to the authors, the process by which Russia seeks to achieve this result consists of three stages. The first requires the continuation of pressure along the entire length of the front in order to exhaust the ammunition and personnel reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In parallel with this, the Russian special services are tasked with breaking the determination of Kyiv's international partners to continue providing military aid.

“Once military aid is significantly curtailed so that Ukraine's ammunition stocks are depleted, Russia intends to launch further offensive operations to achieve significant – albeit slow – gains on the battlefield. Then they intend to use these gains as a lever of influence on Kyiv to force them to capitulate on Russian terms," the scientists believe.

According to this plan, victory in the Kremlin is expected by 2026. At the same time, the authors do not rule out that the Kremlin's goals may expand with success or that Moscow may violate any agreements both with Ukraine and with NATO.

"The Russian theory of victory is likely if Ukraine's international partners cannot adequately provide the Armed Forces with resources. However, if Ukraine's partners continue to provide the Armed Forces with sufficient ammunition and training support to suppress Russian attacks in 2024, Russia is unlikely to make significant gains in 2025," Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds believe.

And even under such conditions, as scientists note, Russia's combat power will decline only after 2026.

Russia's military potential

The Russian army started 2023 with a very disorganized force in Ukraine, numbering approximately 360,000 troops. By the start of the Ukrainian offensive in June 2023, the number had grown to 410,000 soldiers and was becoming increasingly organized. As of the beginning of 2024, the Operational Group of the Russian Armed Forces in the occupied territories already has 470,000 servicemen.

Despite the lack of trained officers and significant losses, the formation of the Russian army is increasing on the territory of Ukraine, experts state.

While no large-scale offensive is currently taking place, Russian units have been tasked with conducting smaller tactical attacks that, at a minimum, inflict sustained casualties on Ukraine and allow the Russian army to seize and hold positions, the report said.

In addition, Russian "recruiters" fulfill almost 85% of the set goals for attracting troops to participate in Ukraine. Therefore, the Kremlin believes that it will be able to maintain the current rate of elimination until 2025."

As for combat equipment, the Russian army group has approximately 4,780 units of barrel artillery, of which 20% are self-propelled; 1130 RSZV; 2,060 tanks and 7,080 other armored combat vehicles, mainly MT-LB, BMP and APC. They continue to be supported by 290 helicopters, including 110 attack helicopters and 310 high-speed jets.

At the same time, in the report, scientists note a shortage of ammunition in the Russian army, which limits its ability to use this technique, as well as a lack of pilots with sufficient experience to perform key missions.

RUSI's overall assessment is that while the quality of Russian forces is unlikely to improve as long as the SFU continues to destroy enemy forces, the Russians will be able to maintain a steady pace of attacks through 2024.

Industrial potential of Russia

In terms of the ability of Russian industry to support ongoing operations, experts note that Russia has significantly mobilized its defense industry. In particular, Moscow increased work shifts and expanded production lines at existing facilities, as well as restored factories that had previously been mothballed. This led to a significant increase in production volumes.

"Russia supplies its troops with about 1,500 tanks a year and about 3,000 armored combat vehicles of various types. Russian missile production has also increased. For example, at the beginning of 2023, Russian production of 9M723 Iskander ballistic missiles amounted to six pieces per month, the available missile stockpiles amounted to 50 ammunition. By early 2024, Russia had not only used a significant number of these missiles every month since the summer of 2023, but had increased its stockpile to nearly 200 9M723 and 9M727 Iskander ballistic missiles. A similar picture can be observed for other main types of missiles, such as the Kh-101," experts noted.

However, despite these achievements, Moscow faces significant limitations in the durability and reliability of its industrial production. Among the tanks and other armored fighting vehicles supplied to the army, approximately 80% are not new, but instead refurbished and upgraded from Russian military stockpiles.

The scientists add that while Russia can maintain a stable production volume until 2024, as early as 2025 it will face the fact that military equipment will need a much more serious renewal, and by 2026 it will exhaust most of its existing reserves.

Another vulnerability for Russia's complex weapons, such as missiles, is its heavy reliance on Western components. Even under existing sanctions, their cost to the Russian Federation has increased by 30%, so the Kremlin has only managed to stabilize supplies and not expand them, despite additional investments.

But perhaps the most serious limitation for Russia is the production of ammunition. In order to achieve territorial gains in Ukraine in 2025, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation estimated industrial needs for the production or supply of approximately 4 million 152 mm and 1.6 million 122 mm artillery shells in 2024. Russian industry said it could increase production of 152mm rounds from about 1 million rounds in 2023 to 1.3 million rounds during 2024 and produce only 800,000 122mm rounds in the same period.

"This means that in order to adequately resource the armed forces, Russia must – in the short term – further deplete its ammunition reserves, most of which are in poor condition. To further compensate for the shortage, Russia has signed supply and production contracts with Belarus, Iran, North Korea and Syria. Although the supply of projectiles from North Korea will help Russia in 2024, it will not compensate for the significant shortage of 152-mm ammunition in 2025,” the authors of the article added.

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